



Ricoeur on Pure Reflection: A Guide to Understanding Human Reality

Francis Jeus B. Ibañez, M.A.

Bohol Island State University – Tagbilaran City Main Campus

University of San Carlos – Talamban, Cebu City

Email: francisjeus.ibanez@bisu.edu.ph

Abstract

In his profound exploration of the will to evil and human error, Paul Ricoeur traverses the intricate landscape of human fallibility, both in its potential and its manifestation. This study meticulously examines these central themes, illuminating the inherent fragility of humanity—a condition that encompasses both malevolent intent and the possibility of benevolence. In his seminal work, *Fallible Man*, Ricoeur articulates the enduring unhappiness that besets humanity, a plight that has persisted since time immemorial. This deep-seated dissatisfaction arises from the unspeakable evils perpetrated by humankind. Ricoeur contends that neither scientific nor philosophical discourses can fully elucidate the human condition, as they are invariably constrained by their own presuppositions. Rather, he posits that a true understanding of our selves necessitates an experiential reflection rooted in narratives and myths. Through a rigorous textual analysis of Ricoeur's writings, this paper proposes that human experience is shaped not predominantly by rationality, but rather by emotions, pathos, and the inescapable sufferings of life. Ricoeur's concept of pure reflection emerges as a crucial element in grasping the fundamental structure of human reality, revealing our intrinsic vulnerability to error. At its apex, pure reflection—as envisioned by Ricoeur—promotes a profound comprehension of human actions and emotions, encapsulated in the notion of the *pathétique of misery*. Consequently, the essence of human reality remains intricately intertwined with the manifold possibilities of fault, fallibility, evil,

errors, and sin. Through this lens, we gain deeper insight into the complexities of human existence, offering a more nuanced understanding of our shared vulnerabilities and moral struggles.

Keywords: fallibility, narrative identity, pathétique of misery, transcendence

Introduction

Philosophical problems compel us to interrogate the fundamental aspects of existence: the world, God, humanity, and the environment that envelops us. Perhaps mankind, in his quest for understanding, strives to comprehend the nature of the world as a means to grasp his origins and constitution, submits to the authority and attributes of his creator in pursuit of redemption, and adapts to the ever-shifting circumstances of his surroundings to ensure survival. Thus, philosophical dilemmas inevitably arise from the tapestry of human experiences. The realm of human experiences encompasses the pursuit of values and an awareness of behavioral norms.¹ Through rigorous processes of philosophical and ethical inquiry, humanity emerges as the central figure in these foundational endeavors. Consequently, philosophical questions pertain to inquiries into human reality, a vast domain often referred to as philosophical anthropology.

In this paper, I argue that Ricoeur's notion of pure reflection is essential for apprehending the innermost structure of human reality, wherein man recognizes himself as inherently fallible.² At its utmost extreme, pure reflection, as Ricoeur contends, culminates in a comprehensive understanding of human actions and emotions, embodied in the concept of the pathétique of misery.³ Therefore,

¹ Chin-Tai Kim, "The Nature and Possibility of Philosophical Anthropology," *Philosophical Anthropology* 20th WCP: 1 [article online]; available from <http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anth/AnthKim.htm>; 10 January 2025.

² Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 1.

³ A method used by Ricoeur to supplement the concept of fallibility in a concrete manner displayed between the interplay of action and feeling. We can detect a certain progression in going from the Platonic myth representing the soul of a mélange to the beautiful Pascalian rhetoric of two Infinities towards Kierkegaard's Concept of Dread... This progression, however, develops in the very interior of images,

human reality is intrinsically linked to the potential for fault, fallibility, evil, errors, and sin.

The Complexities of Selfhood and Identity

This paper also addresses the issue of identity. Ricoeur invites us to explore the realm of selfhood, which should not be confined to the context of the "ego cogito" of Cartesian meditation. He elucidates that the term "identity" possesses an equivocal nature, encompassing both sameness (idem-identity) and selfhood (ipse-identity).⁴ Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding the term "identical" will serve as the fulcrum for reflections on personal and narrative identity. The former, according to Ricoeur, is fraught with challenges due to the ambiguity between identity as sameness and the more nuanced notion of selfhood. Thus, selfhood cannot be equated with mere sameness.⁵ Life, then, becomes inextricably entwined with narrative; we articulate a life story to encapsulate the journey from birth to death.⁶ In succinct terms, narratives are indispensable for initiating our understanding of the self; they represent the only form of identity accessible to human beings.⁷

Within the narrative dimension of identity, the question of selfhood remains paramount. According to Ricoeur, this question resides within the orbit of 'who?': Who speaks? Who acts? Who narrates his or her own story? Who is the moral subject of imputation?⁸ The fourth inquiry into selfhood pertains to the ethical and moral determinations of action and their relation to the subject of

figures, and symbols, and it is through these that pathos reaches mythos, which is already discourse. Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 6-7.

⁴ Paul Ricoeur, "The Question of Selfhood," in *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992) 2-3.

⁵ Because the major distinction between them (selfhood and sameness) is not recognized... the solutions offered to the problem of personal identity is found in the narrative dimensions. Paul Ricoeur, "Personal Identity and Narrative Identity," in *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 116.

⁶ Paul Ricoeur, "Life in Quest of Narrative," in *On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation*, ed. David Wood (London: Routledge, 1991), 20.

⁷ Paul Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity," *Philosophy Today* 35, no.1 (1991), 73.

⁸ Paul Ricoeur, "The Self and the ethical Aim," in *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 169.

action, forming a new mediation along the return path to the self.⁹ Here, we discern that human reality, through the lens of Ricoeurian thought, is phenomenological, hermeneutical, ethical, and political, addressing the complexities of the human subject. Ultimately, Ricoeur presents us with the challenge of cultivating a good life with and for others, within just institutions¹⁰—a task that entails fostering moral qualities such as self-esteem, solicitude for others, and the aspiration to thrive within a framework of justice.

Understanding Introspection

Common misconceptions arise when pure reflection is conflated with *introspection*. This latter term was first pioneered and popularized by the esteemed psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, who conceptualized introspection as a method for experimental self-observation, aimed at analyzing the content of one's thoughts.¹¹ Introspection inherently resides within the psychological domain, centering on the contemplation of one's own thoughts and feelings. We must exercise caution with the term "own," for it implies a self-examination confined to the horizons of individual consciousness. Indeed, introspection cannot adequately address the complexities of human reality, as it is limited to an examination of mental states. Furthermore, introspection is closely related to self-reflection and stands in contrast to external observation, generally providing privileged access to our mental states unmediated by other sources of knowledge. This unique access renders the individual mind's experience particularly distinct. Therefore, its primary function is to ascertain the status of one's sensory, cognitive, and emotional states.¹²

The Role of Pure Reflection

In stark contrast, pure reflection emerges as a tool developed by Paul Ricoeur to scrutinize the workings of consciousness,

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 172.

¹¹ Kendra Cherry, "Introspection and How It Is Used in Psychology Research," *Verywellmind* <http://psychology.about.com/od/historyofpsychology/fl/What-Is-Introspection.htm>. Accessed 10 January 2025.

¹² "Introspection," *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Introspection>. Accessed 10 January 2025.

harkening back to the Cartesian first truth: "I think, therefore I am." For Ricoeur, the notion of the "ego cogito" falls short of disclosing the truth about the self, for it lacks both intellectual intuition and psychological evidence. Simply put, the ego posited in the ego cogito remains abstract and devoid of substance; it is ultimately unassailable.¹³

Moreover, reflection should not be misconstrued as a form of intuition, which privileges the immediacy of knowledge as the only certainty. Ricoeur posits that both self-understanding and the comprehension of external objects necessitate an intermediary step — pure reflection. He asserts:

Reflection is not intuition; or, in positive terms, reflection is the effort to comprehend the ego of the ego cogito in the mirror of its objects, its works, and ultimately its acts. Now, why must the positing of the ego be re-comprehended through its acts? Precisely because the ego is not given in psychological evidence or in intellectual intuition or mystical vision. A reflective philosophy is precisely the opposite of a philosophy of the immediate. The Cartesian first truth must be mediated by representations, action, works, institutions, and monuments which objectify it; it is in these objects, in the broadest sense of the term, that the ego must lose itself to find itself.¹⁴

The preceding statements elucidate that understanding the self does not arise from direct intuition of the self by the self but rather through an engagement with the world. Thus, Ricoeur underscores the necessity of introspective self-awareness losing itself in order to find itself, delineating "the grandeur and the limit" of humanity.¹⁵ Reflection serves as an interpreter of the world's objects or signs, through which an individual may render an image of self. This implies that "reflection must become interpretation," as the sole pathway

¹³ Alexis Deodato S. Itao, "Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics of Symbols: A critical Dialectic of Suspicion and Faith," *Kritike* 4, no. 2 (2010): 10.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

¹⁵ Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), xxix.

available to humanity for self-understanding unfolds through symbolism and narrative.¹⁶

The Transcendental Dimension of Reflection

In *Narrative Identity*, Ricoeur asserts, as cited by Itao:

...that knowledge of oneself is an interpretation; the interpretation of the self, in turn, finds narrative, among other signs and symbols, to be a privileged mediation; this mediation borrows from history as much as fiction, rendering the life story a fictive history or, if one prefers, a historical fiction—comparable to those biographies of great men wherein history and fiction are found intricately woven together.¹⁷

Self-knowledge, therefore, does not arise from immediate intuition but rather emerges indirectly through the narratives that populate our daily lives, expressed through various cultural signs. One form of this manifestation occurs when a reader appropriates the identity of a fictional character.¹⁸ Reflection, through the lens of narrative interpretation, is characterized as the appropriation of our endeavor to exist and our desire to be, articulated through the works that bear witness to that endeavor and desire;¹⁹ the figure-able character of the individual, termed a figured self, appears as this or that.

In *Fallible Man*, Ricoeur asserts that access to a genuinely philosophical anthropology of man arises from a reflection of a “transcendental” nature, one that commences not with the self but with the object before oneself, tracing back to its conditions of possibility. This reflection, therefore, adopts a transcendental character, distinct from psychological reflection, as the ontological constitution of the object —its inherent objectivity—guides the subsequent awareness of subjective synthesis itself.²⁰ This endeavor

¹⁶ Itao, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of Symbols, *Kritike*, 11.

¹⁷ Paul Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” 73.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹⁹ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Dennis Savage (New Haven: Yale University press, 1970), 46.

²⁰ Paul Ricoeur, “Pure Imagination,” in *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 5.

entails an investigation into the depths of humanity's most radical disproportion.²¹ More precisely, it is upon the object that this reflection discerns the potential for knowing, unveiling the specific disproportion of knowledge between receiving it and determining it. The reflection upon the object apprehends the power of synthesis — a notion that resonates with the myth of *mélange* and the rhetoric of misery, contributing to a deeper understanding of man's condition.²²

Reflection vs. Introspection: A Comparative Analysis

Immediate understanding of the self by the self lacks access to the *pathétique*, and introspection, in its rigor, yields no profound insights. However, reflection is not to be mistaken for introspection, reflection traverses that indirect path via the object. It is a reflection of the object itself. Thus, it embodies transcendental characteristics: it reveals within the object that which renders the synthesis possible within the subject.²³

The distinction between reflection and introspection is crucial in philosophical discourse. Introspection involves a direct inward gaze—a self-examination confined within the boundaries of the mind. It is a process centered on the immediate and isolated understanding of one's thoughts and feelings, devoid of external mediation. Introspection's scope is limited to the subjective realm, rendering it insufficient for grasping the broader and more complex dimensions of human reality.²⁴

Reflection, on the other hand, embarks on a more indirect journey through the external world. It is not a solitary inward look but rather a mediated engagement with the objects of the world. By reflecting upon objects, actions, and external phenomena, one gains insights into the self that are otherwise inaccessible through mere introspection. This process of reflection reveals the underlying structures and conditions that make synthesis within the subject possible.²⁵

²¹ Paul Ricoeur, "The Pathétique of "Misery" and Pure Reflection," in *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 5.

²² Paul Ricoeur, "The Transcendence Synthesis," in *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 18.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 5.

²⁵ Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 18.

In this context, reflection takes on a transcendental quality. It transcends the immediate confines of the subjective mind and engages with the external world to uncover the conditions of possibility for knowledge and understanding. By examining objects and externalities, reflection discloses the mechanisms and dynamics that shape our cognition and self-awareness. It is through this mediated, outward-directed process that reflection reveals the deeper connections between the self and the world, allowing for a more comprehensive synthesis of subjective and objective realities.²⁶

Thus, reflection, with its transcendental characteristics, serves as a bridge between the internal and external realms, enabling a profound understanding of the self that introspection alone cannot achieve. It is in this interplay between the subject and the object that the true nature of human cognition and self-understanding is revealed.²⁷ In this contention, Ricoeur argues that the conditions of possibility embedded within the structure of an object transcend the *pathétique* and invite philosophical inquiries into the dilemmas of disproportion and synthesis.

The Impact of Misery on Human Existence

In *Fallible Man*, Ricoeur elucidates the multifarious unhappiness that is an intrinsic aspect of human existence—a condition that has persisted since time immemorial. This pervasive discontent arises from the unspeakable evils wrought by humanity upon itself. Neither the languages of science nor those of philosophy can fundamentally assist man in grasping his condition, for both disciplines are undergirded by presuppositions. According to Ricoeur, self-understanding is not attained through mere introspection; rather, it emerges from a form of experiential reflection derived from the narratives and myths that shape our lived experiences. Our most fundamental experiences reveal our propensity for error, and we instinctively discern a disjunction between the person we believe ourselves to be and our actual selves. At the core of our being lies an awareness of our capacity for mistakes, accompanied by the

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Paul Ricoeur, "The Unity of the Voluntary and the Involuntary as a Limiting Idea," in *Readings in Existential Phenomenology*, ed. Nathaniel Lawrence and Daniel O'Connor (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), 93–108.

realization that we are not always the embodiment of our intentions. This understanding is not merely a product of rationality but is deeply rooted in feeling, pathos, and the inherent misery of life. The pathétique of misery captures the essence of humanity, predating our efforts to articulate it. This profound sentiment compels us to seek a logical framework through which to explain our condition. Evil, as the central figure of misery, finds elucidation in the myths and allegories we construct within our daily lives. It is not that evil merely befalls us; rather, we ourselves exist in a fallen state.

The Interplay of Cartesian Thought and the Limits of Human Existence

Ricoeur's deep analysis of misery invites exploration of significant philosophical texts, including Descartes' fourth meditation, which foregrounds the role of the cogito; Plato's *Republic*, with its allegories of the soul; and Pascal's "Pensées," all of which illuminate man's relationship with religion and the divine.

The Cartesian cogito, explicitly articulated in the fourth meditation, posits that human beings are fundamentally thinking entities. However, Ricoeur's inquiry uncovers that even within the realm of human thought, there exists an absence of essence. The "I" encapsulated in "I think" conveys merely an empty signifier. Thus, humanity finds itself ensnared within its own confines, endowed with both infinitude and finitude. While man possesses infinite possibilities, he is constrained by resources, time, and his capacity to comprehend the complexities of life. Descartes' analysis positions man in the liminal space between being and nothingness, wherein he is aware of both yet fully partakes in neither.²⁸ By beginning with the Cartesian theme of the finite-infinite entity, we disentangle ourselves, as Ricoeur suggests, from the prevailing tendency to view finitude as the singular characteristic of human reality.²⁹

In this discourse, we can illuminate the vital role of pure reflection within Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology. Previously, we observed that reflection implicates an understanding of oneself by first engaging with the object of contemplation. Through this rigorous process, man comes to realize his own potential—the delicate

²⁸ Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 2.

²⁹ Ibid., 3

interplay of disproportion and synthesis—confronting the challenges related to his cognitive capacity and inherent fallibility.

Ricoeur's conception of freedom deviates markedly from traditional scholastic interpretations. It manifests not in a straightforward understanding but rather conceals itself beneath the veneer of autonomy. For Ricoeur, freedom is inextricably intertwined with nature, which serves to limit its horizon. In this light, freedom is inherently constrained.

The Reflective Journey: Navigating Human Potential and Fallibility

To assert this convincingly, one may contend that freedom and nature operate dialectically or can alternatively be reduced to the complementary notions of the voluntary (freedom) and the involuntary (nature). Ricoeur assigns the realm of the “involuntary” to things external to the will, while the “voluntary” pertains to the internal acts of the will, including deciding, moving, and consenting. In *The Unity of the Voluntary and the Involuntary as a Limiting Idea*, Ricoeur articulates:

The three aspects of the voluntary, which seem complementary in description—deciding, moving, and consenting—appear in a progressive order from the perspective of ‘practical mediation.’ A decision is a reflexive moment, both intentional and receptive (I decide that...because...), directed towards motives; effective action ‘fills’ the ‘empty’ intention of the project and culminates in tangible results through the body. The reflective aspect of effort is understood as the complication of motion that initiated as a manifestation of bodily spontaneity... ‘Practical mediation’ necessitates, for its fulfillment, my consent to that which I cannot alter; by consents to this necessity, I transcend the refusal of my human condition, which yearns for totality, self-transparency, and self-sufficiency.³⁰

³⁰ Paul Ricoeur, *Readings in Existential Phenomenology*, 93-94.

The act of deciding and moving achieves fruition when "consent," in its most profound mediation, compels the body to cooperate, thereby culminating in the attainment of totality. However, such fulfillment is fraught with challenges, as the entirety of the psychology of will revolves around the inherent tension manifest in bodily resistance.³¹ Ricoeur acknowledges this difficulty in terms of emotion and habit—interrelated properties of the involuntary embedded within the corporeal self.

Indeed, it is noteworthy that these two functions—emotion and habit—are understood in juxtaposition: one representing a nascent irregularity, the other influencing the will through the weight of the past. Habit is "contracted," whereas emotion unexpectedly "takes one by surprise;" habit, replete with history, bears prestige; emotion, fresh and unrefined, holds transformative power; habit is the product of enduring experiences, while emotion signifies the irruption of the moment.³²

These assertions illuminate the dialectical interplay between habit and emotion. The body is interwoven with both emotive and habitual elements that mediate our acts of will.³³ Ricoeur further articulates that the locus of resistance within voluntary life manifests fully—a functional resistance born of spontaneity. Consequently, the inherent hold on my body is, at all times, one that is semi-regained. We recognize that the unity of the voluntary and the involuntary, of effort and spontaneity, remains a limiting idea. Failure in achieving this unity emerges not as a source of scandal but rather as a manifestation of conflict.

This conflict encapsulates the dramatic duality of humanity, inscribed with inventiveness alongside lawfulness, an agile will be juxtaposed with a docile body, consent interwoven with necessity.³⁴ In summation, the conception of freedom articulated here is distinctly human freedom, not creative but motivated, achieved, and situated within the corporeal realm. This brand of freedom engenders a conflict between action and emotion, thus opening the door to the profound concept of fallibility.

³¹ Ibid., 98.

³² Ibid., 103.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 108.

Conclusion

Humanity is fallible, for the potential for evil is deeply rooted in its very constitution.³⁵ Pure reflection serves as the crucial instrument for grasping the notion of fallibility. Ricoeur embarks upon his inquiry with an analysis of Descartes' assertion in the *Meditations*: "I find myself subject to an infinity of imperfections, so that I should not be surprised if I err."³⁶ This assertion implies that human reality is ontologically predisposed to err or sin. The concept of "disproportion"—the dissonance of the self with itself—underlies the essence of fallibility. It signifies that man embodies an unstable ontological constitution, perpetually oscillating between states of greatness and lesser truth. Therefore, embracing one's finitude is synonymous with acknowledging the inevitability of one's own fallibility.

Moreover, Ricoeur utilizes the pathétique of misery as a non-philosophical, pre-comprehensive narrative that captures the essence of humanity. Infused with the Platonic myth of the soul, the Pascalian rhetoric of two infinities, and Kierkegaard's notion of dread, this progression unfolds within a rich tapestry of images, figures, and symbols. It is through these elements that pathos metamorphoses into mythos, transforming into a discourse that resonates with our existence.³⁷ Man, prior to any ethical treatise, philosophical insight, or cultural ideal, finds himself perpetually ensnared in a state of misery. Our imperative, therefore, is to reflect upon this pre-comprehension of misery through the lens of pure reflection. In doing so, humanity can cultivate a narrative identity—an understanding of self that emerges from the experiences and sentiments evoked by stories and myths. Through this reflective process, man comes to the realization that he is not merely an acting being; he is, more importantly, a judging being—one who is compelled to choose the most virtuous actions for himself and for others. The ethical dimension in Ricoeur's conception of humanity is thus firmly grounded in the principle of justice,

³⁵ Paul Ricoeur, "Conclusion: The Concept of Fallibility," in *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 113.

³⁶ Paul Ricoeur, "Pathétique of Misery and Pure Reflection," in *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 1.

³⁷ Ricoeur, "Pathétique of Misery and Pure Reflection," in *Fallible Man*, *ibid.*

illuminating the path toward a more profound understanding of our shared existence.

References

- "Introspection," *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Introspection>. Accessed 10 January 2025.
- Itao, Alexis Deodato S. "Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics of Symbols: A Critical Dialectic of Suspicion and Faith." *Kritike*, vol. 4, no. 2 (2010): 10-11.
- Kendra Cherry, "Introspection and How It Is Used in Psychology Research," *Verywellmind* <http://psychology.about.com/od/historyofpsychology/fl/What-Is-Introspection.htm>. Accessed January 10, 2025.
- Kim, Chin-Tai. "The Nature and Possibility of Philosophical Anthropology." *Philosophical Anthropology* 20th WCP, 1. Accessed January 10, 2025. <http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anth/AnthKim.htm>.
- Ricoeur, Paul. *Fallible Man*. Translated by Charles A. Kelbley. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "Conclusion: The Concept of Fallibility." In *Fallible Man*, translated by Charles A. Kelbley. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "Life in Quest of Narrative." In *On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation*, edited by David Wood. London: Routledge, 1991.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "Narrative Identity." *Philosophy Today* 35, no. 1 (1991): 73-80.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "Personal Identity and Narrative Identity." In *Oneself as Another*, translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "Pure Imagination." In *Fallible Man*, translated by Charles A. Kelbley. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "The Pathétique of 'Misery' and Pure Reflection." In *Fallible Man*, translated by Charles A. Kelbley. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.

- Ricoeur, Paul. "The Question of Selfhood." In *Oneself as Another*, translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "The Transcendence Synthesis." In *Fallible Man*, translated by Charles A. Kelbley. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "The Unity of the Voluntary and the Involuntary as a Limiting Idea." In *Readings in Existential Phenomenology*, edited by Nathaniel Lawrence and Daniel O'Connor. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.